The tension between global economic integration and ethnocentrism is a growing political force across industrialized countries. Whereas extent research focuses on ethnocentrism's influence on individual attitudes, we show that ethnocentrism directly exacerbates economic decline by reducing greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI), the creation of new foreign-owned firms. We exploit greenfield FDI's universal popularity to isolate ethnocentrism's effects on economic activity. Our analysis of US state greenfield FDI flows during 2004-2011 also holds constant country-level factors that correlate with both ethnocentrism and propensity to receive FDI. A one standard deviation increase in state-level ethnocentrism corresponds to nearly $100 million less greenfield FDI and 50 fewer jobs per state-year on average. Findings are robust to controls for state economic conditions, FDI transactions costs, existing FDI stock, size of foreign-born population, and state partisanship. These findings demonstrate the economic cost of ethnocentrism-based political strategies and that mass political sentiment undermines economic integration.
Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the ascendance of far right political movements lay bare a sharp and rising tension between global economic integration and ethnocentrism, the psychological tendency to parse the world into virtuous in-groups and nefarious out-groups. Public opinion research correlates ethnocentrism with opposition to immigration, trade, and foreign outsourcing.
1 These findings suggest that ethnocentrism's effects are indirect, manifesting in mass political behavior that in turn may shape policy (Kinder and Kam 2009 ).
By contrast, we argue that ethnocentrism directly undermines economic integration.
Ethnocentrism erodes the trust necessary to form and sustain cross-border contractual relationships, creates an aversion to the consumption of foreign products, and weakens the information exchange necessary for efficient markets (Verleigh and Steenkamp 2009 , Guiso et al 2009 , Fernández 2011 . The challenge to establishing ethnocentrism's direct costs is that it correlates with other country characteristics that influence the depth of economic integration. A further challenge is parsing ethnocentrism from concerns about integration's economic effects.
We demonstrate ethnocentrism's direct costs by exploiting the popularity of greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign firms' investments to establish new production facilities. immigration policy?" We construct Ethnocentrism by standardizing survey responses such that "1" reflects pro-immigration sentiment and "0" reflects anti-immigration sentiment, and calculating average sentiment for each state-year. 11 We expect that higher anti-immigrant sentiment corresponds to less greenfield FDI.
We control for several state characteristics that influence foreign firms' location decisions. 12 Agglomeration -the geographic clustering of FDI -facilitates knowledge spillovers (Head et al 1995 (Head et al , 1999 Bobonis and Shatz 2007) . We expect agglomeration to boost FDI irrespective of ethnocentrism. We include log(Greenfield Investment) t-1 , the sum of all greenfield FDI into state j in the previous year and log(Number of Foreign Acquisitions), the total number 8 We also estimate OLS models and obtain consistent results (see online appendix).
9 Findings are also robust to inclusion of year fixed effect (see online appendix). 10 We have 6-16 polls/year. Years closer to a presidential election year have more annual polls.
11 Some surveys give the option to maintain the status quo. We assign .5 to these cases. We used local polynomial smoothing to remove noise from state-years; this significantly affected only three states with relatively few respondents: Alaska, Wyoming, and Idaho. We verify our findings are robust to an analogous measure of pro-immigration. See online appendix.
12 See online appendix for data sources and all summary statistics. human capital and more highly educated populations exhibit less ethnocentrism (Hainmueller 13 Greenfield FDI and foreign acquisitions are rarely substitutes. The former is a strategy to enter markets or expand vertical supply chains whereas the latter is to acquire productive assets (Nocke and Yeaple 2007) .
14 Data on states' investment incentives are unavailable but incentives rarely drive firms' location decisions (Head et al 1999 , Jensen et al 2014 , 2015 . Indeed, research on incentives focuses on why they are political popular despite being ineffective.
15 State labor laws do not vary during the sample period. 16 We are agnostic as to the sign of these coefficients. Firms want minimize costs but higher wages typically correspond to greater productivity. 
